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LIFE IN THE SLOWER LANE: THE HAMPTON ROADS ECONOMY
We’ve seen this movie before.
– William Ackman in The New York Times, Oct. 30, 2015
H
ave we seen this movie before? Perhaps, if the cinematic story line 
focused on the economy of Hampton Roads. With regard to our 
regional economy, 2016 turned out to be very much like 2015. 
Stagnant defense spending, modest improvements in the tourism and 
port sectors, slow growth in jobs and incomes, and continued gentle improvements 
in the housing market – together, these added up to an unimpressive economic 
performance for Hampton Roads in 2016. 
In this chapter, we will assess our overall economic performance and focus on 
two of our regional “big three” economic pillars – defense spending and the 
port. We’ll also take a look at our gradually improving housing market. We 
will examine the third pillar, hotels and tourism, in the next chapter.  
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Regional Economic Growth
Our regional economy is on track in 2016 to record a “real” 
(after inflation) economic growth rate of 1.20 percent – well 
below our 2.60 percent average economic growth rate over 
the past 30 years (see Table 1 and Graph 1). This translates to total 
regional economic activity valued at $96.27 billion.
While Hampton Roads would have the 60th-largest economy in the world if 
it were an independent nation, our relatively anemic economic growth when 
compared to similar metropolitan areas in the southern United States should 
be of concern. The challenge of fostering economic growth in Hampton Roads 
in the face of decelerating defense spending, slow growth in the private sector, 
and modest improvements in the housing market should be a major agenda 
item for decision makers in both the public and private sectors.
If we peruse Graph 1 a bit more, we can see that Hampton Roads grew faster 
than the nation during much of the last decade. Between 2001 and 2009, 
our gross regional product grew 26.6 percent – almost twice the 14.8 percent 
national rate of growth during the same time period. There is little mystery 
why this was so – rapid increases in defense spending. Decelerating defense 
spending is an important (though not the only) reason why our regional 
economic growth rate has declined.  
At the same time, Graph 1 discloses that our regional economic growth has 
been relatively stable in recent years. While we would prefer higher economic 
growth rates, there are some virtues associated with economic stability. 
Consistency reduces economic disasters, bankruptcies and unanticipated 
economic reverses.  
TABLE 1
NOMINAL AND REAL GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT GROWTH 
IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2016
YEAR
NOMINAL GRP 
BILLIONS OF $
REAL GRP 
(2009=100) 
BILLIONS OF $
REAL GRP 
GROWTH RATE 
PERCENTAGE
2001 $54.04 $67.46 3.96%
2002 $57.37 $69.52 3.06%
2003 $61.73 $72.55 4.35%
2004 $65.40 $74.70 2.97%
2005 $70.44 $77.72 4.04%
2006 $74.95 $80.12 3.09%
2007 $78.94 $81.94 2.28%
2008 $80.18 $81.59 -0.43%
2009 $82.14 $82.14 0.67%
2010 $83.12 $82.08 -0.08%
2011 $84.66 $82.55 0.57%
2012 $87.36 $83.41 1.04%
2013 $89.05 $83.55 0.17%
2014 $90.77 $83.43 -0.14%
2015 $93.10 $84.38 1.14%
2016 $96.27 $85.39 1.20%
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
Note: Data incorporate U.S. Department of Commerce personal income revisions through September 2015. 
Base year is 2009. 
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GRAPH 1 
REAL GROWTH RATES IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT (GRP) IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2016
Sources: Table 1 and U.S. Department of Commerce
Graph 1 
Rate of Growth of GDP (U.S.) and GRP (Hampton Roads): 2001-2016  
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The Impact Of 
The Great Recession
National economic conditions are at least as important as defense spending in 
deciding the fate of our regional economy. The National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) is tasked with determining when economic recessions begin 
and end. For the United States, the NBER says that what now is termed the 
Great Recession began in December 2007 and ended 18 months later in June 
2009. However, even when the NBER says economic growth has resumed and 
a recession is over, economic conditions still may be mediocre, or even dismal.  
In the Great Recession, for example, the country lost more than 8 million jobs 
and millions of Americans remained unemployed even after the NBER declared 
the Great Recession ended. Graph 2 drives this point home. It took 76 months 
(more than six years) for the U.S. economy to recover all of the jobs it shed 
during the Great Recession. Measured in terms of job losses and the duration 
of those job losses, this was indeed the worst economic recession our nation 
experienced since the Great Depression.
So also it was in Hampton Roads, where we lost more than 
38,000 jobs from our previous peak level of employment in 
July 2007. The unfortunate truth is that we have yet to recover 
all of these jobs (see Graph 3). Mid-2016, our regional job 
total still was 1.68 percent below our 2007 pre-recession level. 
Graph 4 reveals that at the beginning of 2016, we still were 
about 10,000 jobs short of regaining all of the jobs we lost in 
the recession.
Job losses and gains in our region have not been spread proportionately 
across all occupations (see Graph 5). Health care and social assistance 
jobs continue to increase in number, recession or not, in Hampton Roads. 
Additional jobs also have appeared in the general areas of management 
of companies and enterprises, accommodation and food services, and 
professional, scientific and technical services. The big job losses in Hampton 
Roads over the past decade have occurred in construction, retail trade, 
information, wholesale trade and real estate. 
Why was the Great Recession so devastating in terms of 
job losses in Hampton Roads? Stagnant defense spending 
is the major reason, but the growing use of labor-saving 
technologies by employers also appears to have had an impact. 
In addition, there may have been an increase in the number 
of structurally unemployed people in our region – there were 
jobs available, but those who were unemployed were not 
qualified to fill them.  
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GRAPH 2
COMPARING THE GREAT RECESSION TO OTHERS: HOW MANY MONTHS IT TOOK THE UNITED STATES TO RECOVER ITS LOST JOBS
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
2	
	
Graph 2 
Comparing the Great Recession to Others: 
How Many Months It Took the United States to Recover Its Lost Jobs 
 
 
 
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
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GRAPH 3
POST-RECESSION JOB RECOVERY IN HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES: 
MEASURED BY TOTAL JOBS RESTORED, 2007-2016
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
Note: Data for Virginia and Hampton Roads are through March 2016.
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Graph 3 
 
Post-Recession Job Recovery in Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United States: 
Measured by Total Jobs Restored, 2007-2016 
 
 
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  
Note: Data for Virginia and Hampton Roads are through March 2016. 
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GRAPH 4
ANNUAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT (JOBS) IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1999 TO 2015 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor CES data and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (not seasonally adjusted) 
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Graph 4 
 
Annual Civilian Employment (Jobs) in Hampton Roads, 1999 to 2015  
 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor CES data and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (not seasonally adjusted)  
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GRAPH 5
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATIONAL SECTORS IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1ST QUARTER 2007 TO 1ST QUARTER 2015
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission: Covered Employment and Wages and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
Note: All data are for the Virginia portion of the Virginia Beach/Norfolk/Newport News metropolitan area.
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Graph 5 
Changes in Employment by Occupational Sectors in Hampton Roads, 
1st Quarter 2007 to 1st Quarter 2015 
 
 
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission: Covered E ployment and Wages and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
Note: All data are for the Virginia portion of the Virginia Beach/Norfolk/Newport News metropolitan area. 
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There is a bright spot associated with these job reallocations. With the major 
exception of the health care and social assistance area, the occupations in 
Hampton Roads that have been adding jobs also have tended to pay higher 
salaries than those formerly occupied by job losers (see Table 2). This change 
in the mix of jobs in our region is one of the reasons why the median (50th 
percentile) household income in Hampton Roads has continued to increase 
and actually expanded a bit faster than was true nationally between 2014 and 
2015 (see Graph 6).      
Some observers have been puzzled by the simultaneous presence of falling 
unemployment rates and tepid job growth in Hampton Roads. After all, how 
could our regional rate of unemployment fall five years in a row (see Graph 7) 
when our regional job creation engine almost stalled?  
The major reason is that labor force participation rates in our region (and 
nationally) have declined. That is, many thousands of people have dropped 
out of the labor force. A complete discussion of the reasons for this is beyond 
the space available to us here, but economic evidence suggests that some 
individuals have become “discouraged workers” who have stopped looking 
for jobs because they don’t think they can find one; an aging population may 
have resulted in fewer people seeking work; a generous social safety net may 
provide some with disincentives to work; and, in some jurisdictions, it has 
become easier to claim disability and leave the labor force. 
The prime age span for people to be in the labor force is 16-64. It is precisely 
people within this age group who have been leaving the labor force. Graph 
8 presents data showing the percentage increase in the rate of those who 
declined to participate in the labor force among ages 16-64 in our region’s 
seven largest cities between 2009 and 2014. That is, these individuals neither 
are employed, nor are they looking for a job. In Hampton, for example, 
between 2009 and 2014, the labor force participation rate of 
individuals ages 16-64 fell by 7 percent.1  
Why are these numbers alarming? Because one way or another, society ends 
up devoting resources to support people of conventional working age who are 
not in the labor force (and in many cases, their families as well). This implies 
increased social safety net expenditures that result in higher taxes or stretched 
services of lower quality, expanded family contributions that draw away from 
1  www.headquarterseconomics.org/par.
other family needs, additional illegal activity, etc. Whatever the reasons, it is 
easy to see that declining labor force participation rates should be a matter of 
concern.  
TABLE 2
AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGES IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES IN 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2007 AND 2015
Industry
1st Quarter 
2007
1st Quarter 
2015
Changes
Management of 
Companies and 
Enterprises
$1,268 $2,491
$1,223 
(96.5%)
Finance & 
Insurance
$1,093 $1,454 $361 (33.0%)
Manufacturing $1,075 $1,251 $176 (16.4%)
Professional, 
Technical and 
Scientific Services
$1,085 $1,278 $193 (17.8%)
Wholesale Trade $902 $1,097 $195 (21.6%)
Transportation & 
Warehousing
$867 $1,053 $186 (21.5%)
Information $891 $1,025 $134 (15.0%)
Health Care & 
Social Assistance
$716 $864 $148 (20.7%)
Construction $739 $844 $105 (14.2%)
Real Estate and 
Rental and Leasing
$671 $821 $150 (22.4%)
Educational 
Services
$681 $769 $88 (12.9%)
Retail Trade $428 $468 $40 (9.4%)
Accommodation & 
Food Services
$258 $301 $43 (16.7%)
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages for Virginia portion of the 
Hampton Roads area and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 6
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN HAMPTON ROADS AND THE UNITED STATES, 1998-2014
Source: www.census.gov/quickfacts (various years)
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Graph 6 
 
Median Household Income in Hampton Roads 
and the United States, 1998-2014 
 
 
Source: www.census.gov/quickfacts (various years) 
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GRAPH 7
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES IN HAMPTON ROADS AND THE UNITED STATES, 2000 TO 2015
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (not seasonally adjusted)   
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Graph 7 
 
Unemployment Rates in Hampton Roads and the United States, 2000 to 2015 
 
 
 
 
Sources:	U.S.	Department	of	Labor	and	the	Old	Dominion	University	Economic	Forecasting	Project	(not	seasonally	adjusted)				
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GRAPH 8
ABSOLUTE PERCENTAGE DECLINE IN THE FULL-TIME LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF THOSE 
AGES 16 TO 64 IN THE LARGEST CITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS AND VIRGINIA, 2009-2014
Source: www.headwaterseconomics.org/tools/economic-profile-system
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Graph 8 
 
Absolute Percentage Decline in the Labor Force Participation Rates of those Ages 16 to 64  
in the Largest Cities in Hampton Roads and Virginia, 2009-2014 
 
 
 
Source: www.headwaterseconomics.org/par 
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Defense Spending And 
Defense Employment
The 10,000-ton economic gorilla that simply cannot be banished to a corner 
in Hampton Roads is defense spending and employment. Yes, the national 
recession inflicted serious damage on our regional economy, but the recession 
is over and we continue to grow slowly. Why? One of the primary reasons is 
tepid defense spending.  
Between 2000 and 2012, total Department of Defense (DOD) spending in 
Hampton Roads almost doubled and grew at an average rate of 5.8 percent 
per year. Things have been very different since then. DOD spending increased 
only 0.5 percent in 2012 and actually declined 4.8 percent during 2013. In 
2016, DOD spending is on track to be 1.9 percent lower than its peak level in 
2012 (see Graph 9). 
How important has defense spending been to Hampton Roads? Graph 10 
shows that defense spending accounted for 44.9 percent of the value of our 
region’s gross output in 2011 and has declined in importance since then. 
Without question, defense spending was the primary economic engine of 
Hampton Roads in the first decade of this century. It is somewhat less important 
in 2016, when we forecast that only 38.9 percent of the value of our regional 
output will be due to defense spending.
Perhaps the most visible evidence of defense spending in Hampton Roads is 
Newport News Shipbuilding, which employs more than 20,000 people and 
constructs huge aircraft carriers and submarines. While physical assets such 
as these are impressive, it is actually defense personnel expenditures that truly 
energize defense spending in Hampton Roads. Expenditures upon the people 
who build and maintain ships, submarines and airplanes and the payments 
made to active-duty and civilian personnel provide the largest defense-oriented 
economic thrust to our regional economy. 
Table 3 compares growth patterns in employment and total employee 
compensation in Hampton Roads for military, federal civilian and private-
sector employees between 1991 and 2014. One can see that military 
employment has shrunk continuously in Hampton Roads over the past quarter-
century even while the total value of compensation paid to this smaller number 
of employees increased, especially between 2001 and 2010, when their 
compensation increased approximately 62 percent. Without question, this was 
the single most important contributor to our splendid regional economic growth 
during this time period.
Note that the number of federal civilian employees in Hampton Roads also has 
declined overall since 1991, even while the total compensation paid to this 
smaller cadre of employees nevertheless increased.  
Meanwhile, private-sector employment in our region has grown since 1991 
(though the Great Recession put a serious crimp in this growth). The total 
compensation paid our private-sector, nonfarm workers increased more than 
50 percent between 2001 and 2014, well in excess of the 34 percent increase 
in the consumer price index over the same period. This means that the typical 
real, after-inflation compensation of a private-sector employee increased by an 
average of more than 1 percent annually.  
The real compensation increases of many workers in our region again focus 
attention on a somewhat unusual employment situation – a period of slow 
total job growth nevertheless paired with a period of increased real employee 
compensation. Ordinarily, sluggish job growth translates into very slow wage 
and fringe benefit growth because employers do not feel the need to compete 
for labor. In recent years in our region, however, a change in the mix of jobs 
in the direction of higher-paid jobs has required employers to bid up the wage 
rates and fringe benefits they offer workers in the expanding occupations. 
Hence, the real compensation of these workers has been increasing.  
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that this rising compensation 
circumstance has applied to all employees, or even a majority of workers. 
Employees in retail trade, for example, on average experienced declining real 
incomes as did those involved in providing educational services. Even so, it is 
a positive development that the real compensation of many Hampton Roads 
employees has increased in recent years.   
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GRAPH 9
ESTIMATED DIRECT DOD SPENDING IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2016
Sources: U.S. Department of Defense and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (includes federal civilian and military personnel and procurement)
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Graph 9 
Estimated Direct DOD pending in Hampton Roads, 2000-  
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Defense and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (includes federal civilian and military 
personnel and procurement) 
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GRAPH 10
PERCENTAGE OF THE GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT (GRP) OF HAMPTON ROADS 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPENDING, 1984-2016
Sources: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Commerce and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Graph 10 
Percentage of the Gross Regional Product (GRP) of Hampton Roads 
Attributable to Department of Defense Spending, 1984-2016 
 
Sources: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Commerce and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
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TABLE 3
GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT AND TOTAL NOMINAL COMPENSATION (WAGES, SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS) FOR 
MILITARY, FEDERAL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE NONFARM SECTORS IN 
HAMPTON ROADS, 1991-2000, 2001-2010, 2010-2014 AND 2013-2014
Percent Change 
1991-2000
Percent Change 
2001-2010
Percent Change 
2010-2014
Percent Change 
2013-2014
Military Employment -21.30% -13.60% -10.00% -0.80%
Military Compensation 5.90% 61.60% -6.50% 0.70%
Federal Civilian              
Government Employment
-20.60% 13.30% -0.60% -1.70%
Federal Civilian 
Government 
Compensation
11.00% 68.60% 7.90% 3.40%
Private Nonfarm 
Employment
22.30% 5.30% 4.20% 0.80%
Private Nonfarm 
Compensation
69.30% 36.40% 12.70% 3.20%
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  
Note: The BEA chooses to label compensation as earnings.
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Decelerating Defense 
Spending
There is an unmistakable connection between our region’s disappointing 
job growth and the deceleration of defense spending. The most important 
dynamic in this regard has been several rounds of federal government budget 
sequestration. Simply put, this involves Congress placing caps on federal 
spending in many areas, including defense. 
Graph 11 provides a visual representation of the impact of federal government 
budget sequestration on “discretionary” defense spending, which conceptually 
includes all defense spending except expenditures on “temporary” overseas 
contingency operations in areas such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. This 
fiscal story begins with the Budget Control Act of 2011, which mandated 
decreases in many kinds of federal spending, including defense spending. 
Since then, there have been three compromise budget bills that have restored 
some federal spending – that is, increased spending above the levels outlined 
in the Budget Control Act of 2011. Where defense spending is concerned, 
these restorations have restored spending in amounts that are represented by 
the areas labeled A, B and C in Graph 11. The area of budget deal C, for 
example, included $25 billion of additional defense spending in FY 2016 and 
$15 billion in FY 2017 – compared to what would have been true without 
sequestration relief.  
Table 4 supplies actual defense spending numbers relating to sequestration. 
One can see that the legislated increase in defense spending between FY 
2016 (which ended on Sept. 30, 2016) and FY 2017 is only $3 billion. Will 
additional sequestration relief be provided? Probably, but such an outcome 
is by no means guaranteed and in any case would not fundamentally alter 
longer-term trends that are moving us toward a smaller active-duty military 
force and gradual reductions in maintenance and readiness levels. The 
reductions in maintenance and readiness reflect both limited funding and the 
relatively heavy recent use of assets and people in order to fulfill the defense 
commitments that the president and Congress have made. It is not clear that 
this approach to defense funding and deployments can continue without 
degradation of performance.    
It seems likely that the size of the active-duty military 
establishment in Hampton Roads will decline further over the 
next few years. As Graph 12 reveals, the number of active-
duty military personnel stationed in Hampton Roads in 2014 
already was more than 27,000 (or about 24 percent) below 
the most recent peak of 113,400 in 2003. Future reductions of 
active-duty personnel in Hampton Roads could be mitigated somewhat because 
scheduled reductions in the overall number of active-duty military personnel 
appear to focus more on the Army and Air Force establishments rather than 
the Navy.2     
What are the longer-term influences that likely will have a negative influence 
upon the size of the naval military establishment in Hampton Roads?  
•  If the United States continues to pivot its military attention toward Asia, then 
the probability increases that our region will lose one aircraft carrier group 
to the Pacific Coast or Hawaii. However, there is increasing uncertainty 
about the ability of the United States to undertake such a pivot given the 
rise of ISIS, the re-emergence of Russia as a regional competitor and the 
uncertainty of allies such as Turkey. The impact of such a movement would be 
reduced by the necessity of all aircraft carriers being refueled and refitted in 
Hampton Roads. 
•  If the prices of new naval ships, airplanes and equipment continue to inflate 
at current rates, and significant budget relief is not forthcoming, the DOD will 
confront a harsh reality – it will be unable to afford the ships and airplanes 
it says it needs, and even replacing the current inventory of ships and 
airplanes will be challenging. This would translate to a decline in the number 
of ships and airplanes in our region and almost surely result in even fewer 
people being based here.  
2  The DOD plans to decrease the active-duty Army roster by 40,000 between 2015 and 2020, while the 
Navy complement will increase by 6,000 during the same period. www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-
congress-2015-2016/reports/51050-2016_FYDP.pdf.
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•  The cost of fringe benefits provided to DOD employees (active-duty and 
civilian) has increased significantly in recent years. Even after some 
unpopular additional cost sharing by DOD employees, this cost exceeded 
$45 billion in FY 2015.3 The rapid rate of growth of fringe benefits, 
especially those involving medical care, diminishes the expenditures that can 
be made for other defense purposes. Once again, the same dollar cannot be 
spent in two places.
•  Some new defense assets require fewer personnel to operate because they 
increasingly rely upon technology rather than people. For example, the new 
100,000-ton super carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), will operate with 
a crew of 800 fewer personnel than older-generation aircraft carriers.4  
•  Some argue that future defense spending should emphasize Special Forces, 
cyber warfare and other nontraditional defense strategies rather than 
notably expensive assets such as aircraft carriers.5 This is not the appropriate 
venue to debate whether military tools such as aircraft carriers best fit the 
United States’ defense needs in contested areas such as the South China Sea. 
3  www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51050-2016_FYDP.pdf.
4  Interview with Matt Mulherin, president of Newport News Shipbuilding, June 27, 2016.
5   See, for example, Jeremy Bender, “A New Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Is Bad News for U.S. Aircraft 
Carriers,” www.businessinsider.com/chinas-growing-military-power-may-make-us-aircraft-carriers-
obsolete-2015-10.
What we can observe is that a de-emphasis on aircraft carriers in favor of 
other defense approaches would seriously disadvantage Hampton Roads.  
All things considered, the outlook for future defense spending 
in Hampton Roads is hardly sanguine. We now have 
experienced more than a half-decade of parsimonious or zero 
annual increases in defense spending in our region. Some 
optimism is required to predict a brighter future.     
TABLE 4
ACTUAL AND ANTICIPATED DEFENSE SPENDING, FY 2010-FY 2021 (BILLIONS OF $)
Defense Spending Caps
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Budget Control Act of 2011 552 552 555 492 502 512 523 536 549 562 576 590
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 552 552 555 518 498 512 523 536 549 562 576 590
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 552 552 555 518 520 521 523 536 549 562 576 590
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 552 552 555 518 520 521 548 551 549 562 576 590
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
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GRAPH 11
SEQUESTRATION AND DEFENSE SPENDING CAPS: FY 2010 TO FY 2021 (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Source: Congressional Research Service: “Defense: FY 2017 Budget Request, Authorization, and Appropriations,” April 12, 2016
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GRAPH 12
MILITARY EMPLOYMENT IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2001-2014
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Graph 12 
Military Employment in Hampton Roads, 2001-2014 
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The Port
Economic activity connected to the Port of Virginia long has 
been an important contributor to the region’s economic well-
being. Depending on who is doing the counting, the Port may 
directly and indirectly be responsible for up to 7 percent of the 
value of our region’s economic activity.  
The Great Recession adversely impacted the Port and the cargo flowing 
through it – whether measured by general tonnage or by 20-foot equivalent 
container units (TEUs). Already by 2009, general cargo tonnage and TEUs had 
declined by 16.4 percent and 18 percent, respectively, from their peak levels. 
The volume of general cargo and TEUs flowing through the Port increased 
every year, 2009 through 2015, with particularly large increases in tonnage 
occurring in 2012 (12.2 percent) and 2013 (7.5 percent). Nevertheless, it 
took the Port almost five years to recover the losses incurred during the Great 
Recession. 
For those not familiar with the terms, we note that general cargo includes 
containers, autos, roll-on/roll-off (automobiles and farm and construction 
machinery), forest products and break-bulk cargo. Most people can identify 
a TEU by sight, but in reality the definition of a TEU is rather flexible. The 
most common notion of a TEU is a 20-foot-long metal box that can be easily 
transferred between ships, trains and trucks. But, the heights of these containers 
are far from being standardized and both 40-foot-long and 45-foot-long 
containers are considered to constitute the equivalent of 2 or 2.25 TEUs.
Old Dominion University’s Economic Forecasting Project estimates that both 
general cargo tonnage and TEUs at our port will increase in 2016 (see Graphs 
13 and 14 for data through 2015), but by rather modest rates because our 
port’s 2015 numbers were inflated by now settled labor problems on the West 
Coast that diverted cargo from ports such as Los Angeles, Long Beach and 
Seattle to the East Coast.6  
6   May over May, loaded incoming TEUs were down 5 percent at Savannah and 2.3 percent at the Port of 
Virginia. Loaded outgoing TEUs were up only 1 percent at Savannah and down 12 percent at the Port of 
Virginia. “Volume Declines at Top Three U.S. Southeast Ports,” Journal of Commerce (June 17, 2016).  
Over the past decade, the Port of Virginia has maintained a TEU market share 
of approximately 16-17 percent of the total TEUs handled by the four largest 
East Coast ports: New York/New Jersey, Savannah, the Port of Virginia and 
Charleston. It appears that in 2016 the Port of Virginia may regain the small 
bit of market share it lost between 2014 and 2015 (see Graph 15). 
A note of concern relates to the increasing proportion of empty TEUs being sent 
out from the Port of Virginia. TEUs loaded with actual product increased by 
only 1.4 percent in 2015, while empty TEUs increased about 35 percent. The 
slow growth of loaded TEUs reflects a variety of factors – declining demand for 
U.S. exports, excess capacity among major ocean carriers, possible adverse 
reactions to congestion challenges at our Port, the expiration of contracts with 
shippers that involved attractive financial incentives, the M2 pact between 
Maersk and Mediterranean Shipping that diverted some Maersk traffic from 
Virginia to Baltimore, the absence of labor problems at other ports that had 
stimulated activity at the Port of Virginia in previous years, and the cooling of 
the Chinese economy.   
Against this, the proportion of shipments leaving the Port of Virginia to 
destinations inside the United States via rail increased from 31.9 percent in 
2012 to 32.9 percent in 2015. This is good news because rail cargo tends 
to be discretionary cargo that might have been routed via a different port. It 
suggests that the Port is winning competitive battles with customers who are 
capable of using multiple ports to ship their products.
Two big international trade developments relating to the Port of Virginia have 
garnered considerable attention. The first is Brexit, the United Kingdom’s 
departure from the European Union. At first glance, it appears that the United 
States has limited exposure to this situation. Only 13.49 percent of U.S. GDP 
is derived from exports, much less than the U.K.’s 27.84 percent, or Germany’s 
stupendous 50.87 percent. Less than 8 percent of Virginia’s gross state product 
is derived from exports. In addition, only 4 percent of U.S. exports go to the 
U.K. (though this is almost 6 percent in Virginia).7  
7  www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/state/data/va.html.
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GRAPH 13
GENERAL CARGO TONNAGE AT THE PORT OF VIRGINIA, 1991-2015
Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
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General Cargo Tonnage at the Port of Virginia, 1991-2015 
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GRAPH 14
TWENTY-FOOT EQUIVALENT CONTAINER UNITS (TEUS) AT THE PORT OF VIRGINIA, 1991-2015
Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
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Graph 14 
Twenty-Foot Equivalent Container Units (TEUs) at the Port of Virginia, 1991-2015 
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GRAPH 15
EAST COAST-LOADED TEU MARKET SHARES OF MAJOR PORTS, 2006-2016
Sources: American Association of Port Authorities and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
Note: Market shares exclude TEUs for Philadelphia, Miami, Palm Beach and Port Everglades. 
*Data are through April 2016.
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Graph 15 
 
East Coast Loaded TEU Market Shares of Major Ports, 2006-2016 
 
 
Sources: American Association of Port Authorities and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  
 Note: Market shares exclude TEUs for Philadelphia Miami, Palm Beach and Port Everglades. Data are through April 2016. 
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With respect to Brexit, greater potential dangers reside in the possibility of an 
international financial crisis that would send lethal ripples around the globe. 
Brexit is uncharted territory, but the 2008 recession should have taught us that 
financial runs can occur in unexpected ways. It will take time to determine the 
ultimate effects of Brexit and much will depend on the negotiations between the 
U.K. and other countries.
Another highly advertised (but surely overemphasized) international trade 
development was the opening of the “new,” improved Panama Canal on June 
26, 2016. The expanded canal now can handle ships carrying up to 10,400 
TEUs.8 The Port of Virginia already is capable of handling such large ships 
because of its enviable 50-foot draft. Our two major East Coast competitors 
– Savannah and New York/New Jersey – have limited capacity to handle 
such ships, though both are spending billions of dollars on dredging, raising 
bridges and other infrastructure improvements designed to remedy their 
deficiencies. For the next year or two, however, the Port of Virginia will retain 
its advantage with respect to large, deep-draft ships. 
An important and expensive public policy question relates to whether our 
Port should be dredged to a depth of 55 feet – which may well be necessary 
to handle the 20,000-TEU ships that already are under construction and will 
begin to dominate the U.S.-Asia trade lanes. The answer to this question is not 
clear. Most of the ships that enter the Port of Virginia currently clearly are not 
giant vessels; however, the global trend is toward larger ships. Even in 2015, 
the Port reported that the average number of TEUs handled per ship was only 
1,510, though this has grown more than 21 percent since 2011. Much more 
than additional dredging would be required in order to unload and service 
huge ships. A variety of potentially expensive adjustments at the Port, including 
multiple shifts of personnel, expedited truck and railroad handling to combat 
congestion, and new equipment and technology would be needed.    
There is little doubt that the Commonwealth of Virginia should be planning for 
deep dredging of the Port of Virginia. Still, how quickly the dredging needs 
to occur is not yet obvious because currently there are many other potentially 
productive uses for funds in and around the Port. Indeed, the most recent 
8   Note that the expanded Panama Canal will not be able to handle the large ships currently being constructed. 
Further, many large ships plying Asia/U.S. routes may opt to travel through the Suez Canal for cost and 
operational reasons.
General Assembly invested $350 million in expanding capacity at the Norfolk 
International Terminal (NIT), the Port’s largest container-handling facility. The 
Port has many needs.
Moderate Recovery 
Continues In Regional 
Housing Markets
Make no mistake – these are not boom times in housing markets in Hampton 
Roads. Our overall regional housing market has continued to struggle relative 
to the national housing market. Nevertheless, by a variety of measures, 
economic conditions have improved dramatically in Hampton Roads housing 
markets since the Great Recession.  
Initially, let’s focus on what has happened to the median sales prices of existing 
homes. Nationally, by the second quarter of 2016, median prices were only 
4 percent below their 2005 level. In Hampton Roads, median sales 
prices of existing homes have increased modestly since 2011 
(see Table 5), but even by the second quarter of 2016, the 
$203,000 median sales price remained 8.96 percent lower 
than its previous peak in the third quarter of 2007. 
On the supply side of the market, the size of the inventory of unsold homes 
on the market is an important measure of overall housing market conditions. 
Graph 16 illustrates that the inventory of homes on the market in our region 
has declined about one-quarter from its 2010 peak of 13,070. This metric is 
highly variable and very cyclical so it is not easy to say what the “normal” level 
is or should be. However, the average inventory of homes on the market over 
the past 22 years has been slightly more than 8,300. The current inventory 
remains substantially above that level.
Much the same pattern appears with respect to the average time a house 
spends on the market before it is sold. This stood at a mere 27 days in the 
halcyon days of 2004 (see Graph 17) and peaked at 102 days in 2011. By 
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May 2015, it had declined to 84 days. However, the average number of days 
on the market since 2000 has been only 68.  
A potential housing market wild card, however, relates to the insertion of 
bank-owned homes (“REO”)9 and short sale homes into the regional housing 
inventory. In general, these two classes of homes are properties that have 
been foreclosed upon and/or repossessed by lenders, abandoned by their 
owners or simply never occupied at all. Short sale homes specifically refer to 
those that will be sold, or have been sold, for a price less than the value of the 
outstanding mortgage.
Together, bank-owned homes and short sale homes constitute “distressed” 
homes. When distressed homes are placed on the market, they typically sell 
for much lower prices than other homes and hence have a distinctly negative 
influence on overall home prices. It is as if a discount box store were to begin 
to sell recognizable, frequently purchased goods, such as computers and 
running shoes, for prices well below those advertised by conventional sellers. It 
drives down prices.
Graph 18 displays the known inventory of bank-owned and short sale 
homes in Hampton Roads. From a low point of 606 in June 2008, the known 
inventory of existing single-family bank-owned and short sale homes steadily 
rose to an estimated 3,224 homes in November 2010 – a more than five-fold 
increase. Since then, this inventory steadily declined to 1,311 in May 2016, 
but still is slightly more than two times the levels observed in June 2008. 
Note that we have attached the adjective “known” to this inventory. One of the 
imponderables associated with this and other housing markets is how many 
additional distressed properties banks and others are holding, but have not 
yet fed into the market. If this number is substantial, then our housing market 
remains far from complete recovery. The problem is we do not know how 
many, though conversations with lenders suggest that they have yet to feed all 
of their distressed properties into the market.
9   REO is an abbreviation for real estate owned properties owned by lenders, for whatever reason.
TABLE 5
MEDIAN SALES PRICES OF EXISTING HOMES: HAMPTON 
ROADS, 2002-2016*
Year Median Price
Annual Percentage 
Change
2002 $116,900 7.30%
2003 $130,000 11.20%
2004 $156,500 20.40%
2005 $192,000 22.70%
2006 $214,900 11.90%
2007 $223,000 3.80%
2008 $219,000 -1.80%
2009 $207,000 -5.50%
2010 $203,900 -1.50%
2011 $180,000 -11.70%
2012 $185,000 2.80%
2013 $190,000 2.70%
2014 $193,205 1.70%
2015 $203,000 5.10%
2016* $203,000 +4.1%*
Sources: Real Estate Information Network Inc. and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. 
*Data for 2016 are through May 2016 and are compared to median price ($195,000) through May 2015.
90% Increase 
from 2002-2007
19% Decrease 
from 2007-2011
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GRAPH 16
ESTIMATED INVENTORY OF HOMES ON THE MARKET IN HAMPTON ROADS, 1995-2016 
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
Note: Inventory is measured by active listings on May 31 of each year.
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Graph 16 
Estimated Inventory of Homes on the Market in Hampton Roads, 1995-2016 
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GRAPH 17
AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS A HOME IS ON THE MARKET PRIOR TO SALE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2015
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  
Note: Days on market are calculated from the date listed to the date under contract for existing homes sold. 
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Graph 17 
 
Average Number of Days a Home Is on the Market 
Prior to Sale in Hampton Roads, 2000-2015
 
 
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project  Note: Days on market are calculated from the date listed to the date under contract for existing homes sold. 
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GRAPH 18
ACTIVE LISTING OF DISTRESSED HOMES (REO AND SHORT SALES) IN HAMPTON ROADS, JUNE 2008-MAY 2016
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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In any case, Table 6 reveals that distressed home sales as a percentage of 
all home sales have declined continuously since REO sales peaked at 26.6 
percent in 2011 and short sales topped out at 9.8 percent in 2012. Even so, 
in 2016, we estimate that 16 to 18 percent of home sales will fall into the 
distressed category. This has a negative influence on home sale prices, and 
Table 7 demonstrates how much. Short sale prices were only 69.4 percent of 
non-distressed sale prices in 2016, while REO (bank-owned) sale prices were 
a dismal 53 percent of non-distressed prices in 2016.  
Taking all into account, what does the future hold for the residential housing 
market in Hampton Roads? Several favorable influences are present. First, 
as has been noted, we do appear to be slowly working our way through the 
distressed housing inventory that has helped depress regional housing prices 
for almost a decade. Second, mortgage rates continue to be attractively low 
and housing is quite affordable in Hampton Roads – if one qualifies for a 
mortgage. 
Table 8 compares the monthly principal, interest and tax payment a mortgage 
holder likely would make on a median-priced home in Hampton Roads to 
the median monthly rent that would be paid to occupy a similar property. 
This “renting versus owning” ratio in 2015 was 1.33 – telling us that renting 
was relatively more expensive than owning. The 1.33 ratio was substantially 
higher than a decade previous, though a reduction from 2013. Simply 
put, owning a home now is relatively more attractive than 
renting in Hampton Roads, taking into account only the basic 
financial numbers associated with each. Of course, this assumes that 
the hypothetical individual has the ability to obtain a mortgage; the ratio has 
relatively little meaning if one cannot do so.
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TABLE 6
REO AND SHORT HOME SALES AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL EXISTING HOME SALES: HAMPTON ROADS, 2006-2016
Year All Sales Short Sales Percent Short Sales REO Sales Percent REO Sales
2006 22,405 3 <1% 56 <1%
2007 19,152 40 <1% 223 1.2%
2008 15,047 217 1.4% 833 5.5%
2009 15,849 598 3.8% 2,271 14.3%
2010 14,696 784 5.3% 3,021 20.6%
2011 15,817 1,127 7.1% 4,213 26.6%
2012 16,856 1,644 9.8% 3,337 19.8%
2013 18,791 1,769 9.4% 3,178 16.9%
2014 18,700 1,347 7.2% 2,744 14.7%
2015 20,592 1,230 6.0% 2,542 12.3%
2016 8,397 431 5.1% 1,028 12.2%
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project (data are through May 2016)
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TABLE 7
THE IMPACT OF DISTRESSED HOME SALES ON HOME PRICES: HAMPTON ROADS, 2006-2016
Year
Non-Distressed 
Sales
Short Sales
Short Sales Price % 
Non-Distressed Price
REO Sales
REO Price % 
Non-Distressed Sales
2006 $250,254 $241,666 96.6 $120,817 48.3
2007 $261,723 $237,897 90.9 $163,421 62.4
2008 $255,852 $239,110 93.5 $184,462 72.1
2009 $243,902 $239,913 98.4 $164,229 67.3
2010 $251,572 $231,211 91.9 $151,612 60.3
2011 $236,358 $212,967 90.1 $135,304 57.3
2012 $237,215 $187,527 79.1 $134,535 56.7
2013 $245,344 $180,001 73.4 $131,644 53.7
2014 $244,940 $171,745 70.1 $128,242 52.4
2015 $251,941 $174,577 69.3 $130,959 52.0
2016* $246,296 $170,876 69.4 $130,438 53.0
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project. Information deemed reliable but not guaranteed. REOs represent bank-owned homes. 
*Data are through May 2016.
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TABLE 8
HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: THE RATIO OF MONTHLY RENT TO MONTHLY PRINCIPAL, INTEREST AND TAX PAYMENTS ON 
A MEDIAN-PRICED HOME IN HAMPTON ROADS, 2002-2015
Year
Median Monthly Rent for a 
Three-Bedroom House
PI&T Monthly for a Median-
Priced Existing House
Ratio of Monthly Rent to PI&T
2002  911 861 1.06
2003 1,037 890 1.16
2004 1,044 1,073 0.97
2005 1,087 1,315 0.83
2006 1,118 1,533 0.73
2007 1,164 1,598 0.73
2008 1,247 1,507 0.83
2009 1,236 1,307 0.95
2010 1,277 1,233 1.04
2011 1,319 1,071 1.23
2012 1,454 1,015 1.43
2013 1,570 1,080 1.45
2014 1,562 1,118 1.40
2015 1,530 1,154 1.33
Sources: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project 
Notes: A real estate tax rate of 1 percent was assumed and also that the mortgage tax benefit received by homeowners compensates them for their insurance and maintenance expenditures. The prevailing 30-year average mortgage 
rate was used for each year.  
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Final Thoughts
Economic recovery continues in Hampton Roads, albeit at a relatively modest 
pace. A combination of the Great Recession and decelerating defense 
spending has caused our regional economic growth rate to trail the rates of the 
United States, the Commonwealth and most of Virginia’s metropolitan areas. 
We have yet to recover all of the jobs we lost in the Great Recession.  
Uncertainties loom on the horizon, and some of these (notably the possibility 
of an international economic slowdown and sluggish defense spending) are 
outside our control. Within our control, however, is a fundamental reorientation 
of how we approach both regional decision making and economic 
development.  
Some pictures actually are worth a thousand words. Graph 19 tells us 
that employment in Hampton Roads is growing more slowly than in any 
comparable southeast United States metropolitan region. Not surprisingly, 
our region suffers from net domestic out-migration as some 
residents leave Hampton Roads for other areas where jobs 
are more plentiful. Graph 20 illustrates this story. Only 
Chesapeake and Suffolk, among our seven largest cities, 
experienced positive average net domestic migration between 
2000 and 2015. All other cities saw more people leaving and 
going to other states than entered from other states.10
When we examine economic growth among comparable metropolitan areas, 
we observe that such growth in Hampton Roads lags that of the Charlotte, 
Charlottesville, Durham, Raleigh and Washington, D.C., metro areas. While 
growth in Hampton Roads is positive, these regions are growing much more 
quickly. Between 2007 and 2014, for example, real, price-adjusted gross 
regional product grew only 1.81 percent in Hampton Roads, but 17.74 percent 
in Raleigh, 4.18 percent in Richmond and 7.36 percent in Washington, D.C.11
The old bromide that either we all hang together or we will all 
hang separately applies to Hampton Roads. An important part 
10   If the populations of the other cities grew between 2000 and 2015, it is because births exceeded deaths in 
those cities and also because of international migration into those cities.
11  Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project.
of the solution to our economic doldrums involves cooperation 
and unified regional action. Still, one must ask, how mediocre 
must our economic performance be, and how long must this 
hold true, before we are willing to act decisively together 
in a regional fashion? “GO Virginia” (the Virginia Initiative 
for Growth and Opportunity) represents a step in the right 
direction, but must be matched over time by a unified agenda 
spanning many items and dramatically more funding.
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GRAPH 19
COMPARING JOB GROWTH IN HAMPTON ROADS TO SELECTED AREAS, 2004-2015
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor CES seasonally unadjusted data and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Graph 19 
Comparing Job Growth in Hampton Roads to Selected Areas, 2004-2015 
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GRAPH 20
AVERAGE ANNUAL DOMESTIC OUT-MIGRATION FROM THE MAJOR CITIES OF HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2015
Source: http://headwaterseconomics.org/tools/economic-profile-system
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Graph 20 
Average Annual Domestic Out-migration  
from the Major Cities of Hampton Roads, 2000-2015 
 
Source: http://headwaterseconomics.org/tools/economic-profile-system 
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What should this agenda include? Based on the experience of other areas, the 
following items commend themselves for our consideration:
•  Make our best case for maintaining and even expanding 
defense spending in Hampton Roads, but incrementally 
diversify and learn not to depend upon it.   
•  Share and jointly provide public services across city and 
county lines. Those new to this topic should consult the 2015 State of the 
Commonwealth Report (www.stateofthecommonwealth.com) to find a list of 
approximately 20 public services for which economies of scale are present 
and hence constitute strong candidates for sharing or merger. We can 
save money and provide superior service if we are willing 
to ignore city and county boundaries as we supply public 
services. Our population already ignores these boundaries 
– almost 65 percent of all workers in Hampton Roads live in 
one city or county, but work in another.
•  Focus on critical transportation needs. Widening I-64 toward 
Richmond is vitally important if we wish to avoid being labeled the end of the 
longest cul-de-sac in the United States. Improving the High Rise Bridge and 
completing the Patriots Crossing are essential if we are to reduce congestion, 
enhance regional cohesiveness and serve a growing Port. Expanding The 
Tide can be part of a regional transportation package, but only if it extends 
to the locations in our area where the people actually live and work – Naval 
Base Norfolk, Old Dominion University and Norfolk International Airport. 
Light rail that extends solely from Eastern Virginia Medical School to the 
Virginia Beach Town Center is of limited use and will have minimal economic 
impact. Finally, the idea of a major regional airport south of the James River, 
serving Richmond and Hampton Roads, continues to be an idea that should 
be explored before our options disappear.
•  De-emphasize economic development ornaments (read massively 
subsidized hotel and entertainment venues for which there is impressively 
little rigorous evidence that such investments pay off) and instead emphasize 
long-term factors that clearly do influence economic growth, especially the 
quality of K-12 schools and the quality of teachers in those schools.  
•  Develop innovation districts designed to incubate startup 
firms and organizations by providing them with space, equipment, 
high-speed internet connections, assistance in writing business plans, access 
to engineering advice and connections to angel investors. Fund the extension 
of these services to qualified small businesses throughout the region. Here 
is a plausible goal: provide funding for these efforts that is at least 10 
percent of the amount currently being provided to highly subsidized private 
businesses that appear to have political clout. Anchor partner institutions, 
including major employers, universities and governmental units, must step 
forward and provide the resources necessary to make this happen. This will 
redound to their ultimate benefit. See Pittsburgh, St. Louis and San Diego for 
successful models.  
•  Expand and exploit the “med/ed” sector consisting primarily 
of Eastern Virginia Medical School and Old Dominion 
University. This is a sound choice for two reasons. First, both health care 
and STEM-related occupations such as engineering and computer science 
are growth areas that have expanded dramatically in size and importance 
for extended periods of time. Second, EVMS and ODU enable us to import 
resources from outside our region in the form of federal research grants 
and highly skilled personnel. Med/ed sectors are dynamic generators of 
attractive, well-paying jobs. Unfortunately, when one contrasts Hampton 
Roads to other roughly comparable metropolitan regions (Richmond, North 
Carolina’s Research Triangle, Charlotte, Baltimore), a highly visible way in 
which we differ is that our region has a much smaller med/ed sector and 
therefore we are missing a vital economic engine. We need conscientious, 
consistent investment in health care research, development and application 
by elected officials and donors in order to move our region to the first 
rank. This is not a strategy that will pay off immediately – but the evidence 
is strong that it will pay off (see the Research Triangle). Virginia Beach’s 
biotechnical initiative fits admirably within this framework.
•  Devote much more attention to on-the-job training and 
retraining activities at the area’s community colleges and employers. 
More focus must be given to educating and training people for the jobs that 
actually are available and in supporting firms that provide internships, on-
the-job training and apprenticeships. We need to be results-oriented in this 
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arena. The 2015 General Assembly took action to move “credentialing” 
programs to the fore. Let’s be the region that leads the way in this regard in 
Virginia.  
•  Renew and expand the attention we give to retiring military 
personnel. Each year, approximately 12,000 military personnel retire 
from bases in our region. These individuals are motivated, reliable and 
have strong work habits. Further, they often bring retirement income with 
them. Among other things, we need a single, one-stop shopping location in 
Hampton Roads where veterans, employers and educational institutions can 
connect and do necessary career-related business. Our current efforts are 
scattered among programs and institutions. We need a unified, coherent 
program designed to attract, retain, train and employ veterans.      
•  Continue to invest in cultural and entertainment amenities, 
but diminish regional competition in this regard. The quality 
of our cultural amenities, entertainment venues and spectator opportunities 
is important to us in many ways. The quality of those amenities can be 
enhanced if we can avoid the “every city must have one of everything” 
syndrome. Most notably, we would be well served by less cultural and facility 
competition between Norfolk and Virginia Beach and the Southside and 
the Peninsula. Let’s act regionally in order to realize economies of scale and 
increase the quality of our amenities.  
With the med/ed exception, we have not presented a “pick the winners list” of 
firms or industries that should be favored above others. Why? Because those 
who attempt to pick winners do not boast very high rates of success. They 
often prove unable to anticipate future changes in supply and demand and 
frequently are influenced by political factors. Hence, we will be better served if 
we invest in those aspects of our environment that accumulated evidence tells 
us are clearly connected to long-term economic growth.
We must recognize that unless the next Google magically 
develops in our midst, economic development in Hampton 
Roads will be a long-term process. Eye-catching, but heavily 
subsidized facilities that shower benefits upon individual 
businesses are not irrelevant, but they distract us from the 
ground truth of economic development reality, namely, 
that sustained economic growth requires highly developed 
human capital, intelligent investments in infrastructure and 
an environment that not only supports, but even applauds, 
startup businesses and entrepreneurs that have found 
profitable ways to meet human needs. No small agenda, this.   

